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Shock Incarceration and Parole
A PROCESS WITHOUT PROCESS
INTRODUCTION
The idea that an inmate could possess a liberty interest
is a relatively recent development in Fourteenth Amendment
law.1 In this context, the term “interest” refers to the rights
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause, which protects against
deprivations of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.” Until the 1960s, courts rarely intervened in prison policy
and considered most corrections issues to be matters of
administrative discretion.2 Starting in 1967, however, courts
began demonstrating a “willingness to apply due process
principles to the post-conviction criminal process.”3 Over time,
courts have found that due process is required at multiple stages
of an offender’s sentencing.4 Courts have required prison
authorities to afford inmates due process before they can be
segregated from the general prison population, subjected to
inferior prison conditions, or otherwise seriously punished for
alleged violations of prison rules.5 The Supreme Court has also
1 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects against
deprivations of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1. These protected rights to life, liberty, and property are often referred to as
“interests” that can inhere in certain things. To say that a person has a “liberty interest” in
something is to say that they cannot be deprived of that thing without due process of law.
2 See Harold S. Parsons-Lewis, Due Process in Parole-Release Decisions, 60
CAL. L. REV. 1518, 1519 (1972).
3 Id. at 1520.
4 See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (holding that counsel must be
provided at deferred sentencing proceedings); Braun v. Rhay, 416 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir.
1969) (holding that counsel must be provided at resentencing proceedings); Hewett v.
North Carolina, 415 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1969) (holding that counsel must be provided
at probation revocation proceedings).
5 See Parsons-Lewis, supra note 2, at 1520; see also Landman v. Royster, 333 F.
Supp. 621, 651-56 (E.D. Va. 1971) (holding that inmates facing prison disciplinary
proceedings are entitled to an impartial hearing where they can present and cross-examine
witnesses and to a decision based on the evidence); Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809,
818-20 (1974) (holding that inmates facing prison disciplinary proceedings are entitled to (1)
notice of the charges, (2) an opportunity to be heard, (3) present and cross-examine
witnesses, (4) an impartial hearing body, and (5) a decision based on the evidence); Bundy v.
Cannon, 328 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1971) (holding that inmates facing disciplinary hearings
are entitled to notice and a hearing before an impartial tribunal).
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held that parolees are entitled to due process in parole-
revocation proceedings,6 as well as in proceedings resulting in
the loss of good-time credits.7
Still, “[i]n this continuum of post-conviction due process—
which begins with sentencing, extends to discipline in prison, and
continues through the revocation of parole—there [was] one
conspicuous void: the parole granting decision itself.”8 Prior to
1979, courts invariably held that parole was not a right but was
merely a privilege that resided solely within the discretion of the
parole board.9 States “had no duty to create a parole system,” and
even if they did create such a system, inmates could only hope for,
and not expect, conditional release.10 Since parole was not a right,
inmates could be deprived of it without due process of law. As a
result, courts never overturned administrative decisions denying
parole for lack of due process.11 In 1979, the Supreme Court
sought to address this void in Greenholtz v. Inmates of the
6 See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (holding that a parolee is
entitled to “(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee
of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and
documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless
the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a ‘neutral
and detached’ hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not
be judicial officers of lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the
evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole”).
7 See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (holding that in proceedings
resulting in the loss of good-time credits or imposition of solitary confinement, due process
requires that the inmate be afforded advance written notice of the claimed violation, a
written statement of fact findings, and the right to call witnesses and present documentary
evidence where such would not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional
goals). Inmates can earn good-time credits for good behavior and successful performance in
assigned programs. See COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW, JAILHOUSE LAWYER’S
MANUAL, ch. 35 (9th ed. 2011). Inmates can also lose good-time credits for bad behavior,
violating rules, or poor performance in programs. See id. Good-time credits are valuable
because they can help an inmate to be released early, though the exact nature of the release
depends on the type of sentence originally imposed. See id.
8 Parsons-Lewis, supra note 2, at 1520.
9 See, e.g., People v. Jennings, 165 N.E. 277, 278 (N.Y. 1929) (“Parole is not a
right, but a privilege, to be granted or withheld as discretion may impel.”); State v. Farmer,
237 P.2d 734, 736 (Wash. 1951) (“The granting of parole is not a matter of right but is a
matter of grace, privilege, or clemency granted to the deserving, and withheld from the
undeserving, as sound official discretion may dictate.”); Herman v. Powell, 367 P.2d 553, 556
(Mont. 1961) (“A prisoner is not entitled to release as a matter of right until he has
completed his maximum sentence.”).
10 Linda M. Trueb, The Expectancy of Parole in Montana: A Right Entitled to
Some Due Process, 48 MONT. L. REV. 379, 379 (1987).
11 See Parsons-Lewis, supra note 2, at 1520; see also ROBERT W. WINSLOW, THE
EMERGENCE OF DEVIANT MINORITIES: SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND SOCIAL CHANGE 325 (1972)
(“Claims that parole was wrongfully denied have been uniformly rejected by the courts.
Even those courts that have insisted upon procedural safeguards on parole revocation, are
reluctant to extend them to the parole granting decision. Courts are even more reluctant to
review the merits of such decisions.”); Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 408-09 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971) (“Like an alien seeking entry into the United
States . . . [the inmate] does not qualify for procedural due process in seeking parole.”).
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Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex when it considered the
question of whether an inmate possessed a liberty interest in
being released on parole.12
In Greenholtz, the Court examined Nebraska’s parole
scheme and found, for the first time, that inmates could have a
liberty interest in parole.13 While the Court reiterated that
inmates do not have an inherent right to parole, it held that the
“unique structure and language” of the Nebraska parole statute
created an “expectancy of release . . . entitled to some measure of
constitutional protection.”14 This type of statutory language was
later referred to by the Court as “mandatory language.”15 Beyond
merely allowing for parole release as a matter of discretion, the
Nebraska parole statute required parole release unless four
specific justifications for deferral were found to exist.16
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the Nebraska statute
elevated the inmates’ “expectancy of parole from the status of a
mere hope to that of a right.”17
The primary implication of Greenholtz was that states’
parole statutes could now be held to confer upon inmates a liberty
interest in parole. Applying the Greenholtz analysis, numerous
parole schemes across the country were held to create a liberty
interest in parole and, as a corollary, required procedures that
conformed with due process.18 Shortly thereafter, however, many
states amended or repealed their parole statutes and replaced any
existing mandatory language that created a liberty interest.19
The New York legislature, perhaps anticipating the
outcome of Greenholtz, repealed its parole law in 1977.20 The law’s
replacement, which became effective on January 1, 1978, lacked
the mandatory language of its predecessor, thereby preventing
any potential future due process claims.21 Indeed, since then, state
12 See Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S.
1, 7 (1979).
13 Id. at 15-16.
14 Id. at 12.
15 Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 371 (1987).
16 Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11-12.
17 Trueb, supra note 10, at 379; see Greenholtz, 442 U.S. 1.
18 See, e.g., Allen, 482 U.S. 369; Williams v. Mo. Bd. of Prob. and Parole, 661
F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1981) (finding that the Missouri parole statute created a liberty
interest); Mayes v. Trammell, 751 F.2d 175 (6th Cir. 1984) (finding that the Tennessee
parole statute created a liberty interest).
19 See, e.g., Maggard v. Wyrick, 800 F.2d 195, 198 (8th Cir. 1986) (discussing
the amendment to the Missouri parole statute that eliminated mandatory language);
Wright v. Trammell, 810 F.2d 589, 590 (6th Cir. 1987) (discussing the amendment to
the Tennessee parole statute that eliminated mandatory language).
20 See id.; see alsoN.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 213 (McKinney 1968) (repealed 1977).
21 Compare N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 213 (McKinney 1968) (repealed 1977), with
Act of Aug. 11, 1977, ch. 904, 1977 N.Y. Sess. Law 1 (McKinney).
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and federal courts have consistently held that the New York
parole scheme does not create a liberty interest in parole.22
Further, any discussion of a liberty interest in parole for the
general New York prison population has been purely academic, as
New York already affords these inmates procedural safeguards
that would conform with due process.23 Thus, the vast majority of
New York inmates have no cognizable due process claim following
a denial of release on parole, either because there is no liberty
interest to begin with, or because they are already afforded all they
are due under the Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence.
Yet there is a small fraction of the New York prison
population that is neither subject to the nonmandatory language
of the 1978 parole statute nor afforded the same procedural
safeguards as other inmates.24 These inmates make up New
York’s Shock Incarceration Program (Shock). Shock is a six-
month program intended to rehabilitate and instill discipline in
certain classes of nonviolent offenders.25 Styled after military boot
camps, Shock requires inmates to participate in rigorous physical
training and various rehabilitative, educational, and vocational
programs.26 Upon completion of the program, inmates are eligible
to receive a Certificate of Earned Eligibility, which, if earned,
makes the inmate immediately eligible for release on parole.27
Since these inmates tend to enter Shock within months of being
incarcerated, they can complete the six-month program well
before they would otherwise be eligible for parole under their
court-imposed minimum sentences. Thus, the immediate parole
eligibility afforded by the program often results in a significant
reduction in the period of incarceration of a given Shock inmate.28
Unlike the general prison population, however, Shock inmates are
not afforded any of the procedural safeguards necessary to ensure
that the parole decision is fair and based on accurate
information.29 Further, the statute mandating the immediate
parole eligibility for Shock inmates contains mandatory language
22 See, e.g., Russo v. N.Y. Bd. of Parole, 405 N.E.2d 225 (N.Y. 1980); Boothe v.
Hammock, 605 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1979); Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2001).
23 See Schwartz v. Dennison, 518 F. Supp. 2d 560, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d,
339 F. App’x 28 (2d Cir. 2009).
24 See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 805 (McKinney 2016); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 867
(McKinney 2016); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i(2)(e) (McKinney 2012).
25 See DEPT. OF CORRECT. SERV., THE NINETEENTH ANNUAL SHOCK LEGISLATIVE
REPORT (2007) [hereinafter SHOCK REPORT]; PRISON VISITING PROJECT, CORRECTIONAL
ASSOCIATIONOFNEWYORK, LAKEVIEWCORRECTIONALFACILITY 3 (2007).
26 See SHOCK REPORT, supra note 25, at 1; PRISON VISITING PROJECT, supra
note 25, at 3.
27 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 805.
28 See SHOCK REPORT, supra note 25, at 1.
29 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i(2)(e).
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that mirrors the language held to have created a liberty interest
in Greenholtz.30 This creates an open question as to whether
Shock inmates have a liberty interest in being released on parole
and, if so, whether the procedures used to determine their
eligibility conform with due process.
This question is not merely academic. Parole boards
can, and do, act improperly in making parole decisions. First, a
parole board may base its denial on incorrect information,
either in the form of actually erroneous information within the
inmate’s file, or by misunderstanding or misstating otherwise
accurate information.31 Second, a parole board may fail to
consider and weigh all the required statutory factors set forth
by the New York legislature in the parole laws.32 Finally, a
parole board may act improperly by considering irrelevant or
impermissible nonstatutory factors in making decisions about
whether to grant parole.33 Yet Shock inmates do not receive
adequate procedural safeguards to ensure that these errors are
addressed on appeal. Shock inmates do not receive a hearing,
and as a result, no hearing transcript is available for appeal
purposes. Further, parole board decisions often provide few
details as to their reasoning for denying parole. This lack of
procedural safeguards deprives Shock inmates of meaningful
appellate review, making it less likely that erroneous parole
denials will be corrected. Thus, the question of whether these
inmates have a liberty interest in parole can have a direct and
significant impact on the length of their incarceration.
This note argues that, under Greenholtz, the mandatory
language in the New York statutes governing the parole review
process for Shock inmates creates a liberty interest in release on
parole.34 Further, the procedures currently in place for reviewing
30 See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 867 (McKinney 2016).
31 See infra Part III.
32 See infra Part III.
33 See infra Part III.
34 The Supreme Court’s decision in Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995),
appeared to cast serious doubt on the continued validity of Greenholtz v. Inmates of the
Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979), stating that “[t]he search for a
negative implication from mandatory language in prisoner regulations has strayed from the
real concerns undergirding the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.” Yet the Court
did not explicitly overrule any of its prior holdings. Connor, 515 U.S. at 483 n.5.
Furthermore, Sandin was decided in the context of prison disciplinary proceedings and not
in the context of parole. Under Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,
490 U.S. 477 (1989), “if a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears
to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow
the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own
decisions.” Id. at 484. Indeed, the majority of Courts of Appeals have continued to apply
Greenholtz’s “mandatory language” test to cases involving liberty interests in parole. See
Jimenez v. Conrad, 678 F.3d 44, 46 (1st Cir. 2012); Snodgrass v. Robinson, 512 F.3d 999,
1003 (8th Cir. 2008); Michael v. Ghee, 498 F.3d 372, 378 (6th Cir. 2007); Montgomery v.
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Shock inmates’ eligibility for parole fall short of the minimum
requirements of due process. Part I of this note provides a brief
history of the Shock program. Part II introduces the Supreme
Court case Greenholtz v. Nebraska and examines the development
of the liberty interest in parole release in the United States and in
New York specifically. Part III examines the effects of the current
parole review process on Shock inmates. Finally, Part IV proposes
that the Shock parole review process should more closely
resemble the process used for other inmates in New York that
provides for a hearing and the ability to present evidence.
I. THE SHOCK INCARCERATION PROGRAM
A. History and Purpose of the Program
New York’s Shock Incarceration Program was created in
July 1987 and is the largest of its kind in the nation.35 In 2007,
there were 1,290 male inmates and 120 female inmates in the
New York program, with 222 additional beds for orientation and
screening.36 In creating the Shock program, the state legislature
concluded that “[c]ertain young inmates will benefit from a special
six-month program of intensive incarceration. Such incarceration
should be provided to carefully selected inmates committed to the
State Department of Correctional Services” who are in need of
substance abuse treatment and rehabilitation.37 The program is
intended to provide “[a]n alternative form of incarceration stressing
a highly structured and regimented routine, which will include
extensive discipline, considerable physical work and exercise and
intensive drug rehabilitation therapy.”38 The legislature believed
that such a program would build character, improve self-esteem,
and promote maturity and responsibility so that upon the
inmates’ release, they would be law-abiding members of society.39
Anderson, 262 F.3d 641, 644 (7th Cir. 2001); McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 903 (9th
Cir. 2002); Maghe v. Koch, 107 F.3d 21 (10th Cir. 1997); Ellis v. District of Columbia, 84
F.3d 1413, 1418 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also Susan N. Herman, Slashing and Burning
Prisoners’ Rights: Congress and the Supreme Court in Dialogue, 77 OR. L. REV. 1229, 1260
n.138 (1998) (noting that Sandin presumably would not apply in the context of challenges to
parole denial). But see Victory v. Pataki, No. 13-3592, 2016 WL 373869, at *7 n.8 (2d Cir.
Feb. 1, 2016); Powell v. Weiss, 757 F.3d 338, 345 (3d Cir. 2014). Thus, whatever the
Supreme Court’s intention in Sandin, courts should continue to follow Greenholtz in parole
cases until such time as the Court explicitly overrules the decision.
35 See SHOCK REPORT, supra note 25, at 1.
36 Id.
37 Act of July 13, 1987, ch. 261, 1987 N.Y. Sess. Law 2013-14 (McKinney).
38 Id.
39 Id.
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In addition to the Shock program’s rehabilitative goals,
the program also operates in conjunction with the Earned
Eligibility Program to allow inmates to be released early. This
furthers the stated goal of the Earned Eligibility Program, which
was established specifically to address the problem of prison
overcrowding.40 Under the program, a new inmate is “assigned a
work and treatment program as soon as practicable.”41 Roughly
two months before the expiration of an inmate’s minimum term,
the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision
(DOCCS) reviews the inmate’s institutional record to determine
compliance with the assigned program.42 If DOCCS determines
that the inmate performed adequately in the program, the inmate
may receive a Certificate of Earned Eligibility.43 An inmate with
a Certificate of Earned Eligibility needs to meet a lower standard
to be granted parole.44
Upon successful completion of the Shock program, an
inmate is eligible to receive a Certificate of Earned Eligibility.45
This affords inmates who complete Shock all the benefits of the
Earned Eligibility Program. But in addition to those benefits,
Shock participants who receive a Certificate of Earned
Eligibility are eligible to be released on parole immediately upon
completion of the Shock program, even if that point is prior to
their serving their minimum sentences.46
B. Administration of the Program
Inmates are first screened for Shock eligibility at a
reception prison.47 This initial screening is based on several
40 See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 805 (McKinney 2016); COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW REVIEW, supra note 7, ch. 36.
41 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 805.
42 See id.; COLUMBIAHUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW, supra note 7.
43 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 805; see COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW,
supra note 7.
44 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW, supra note 7, ch. 36, at 11 (“First,
the Parole Board may not consider whether your release will ‘so deprecate [the]
seriousness of the crime,’ which is the standard the Board uses for prisoners who do not
have a [Certificate of Earned Eligibility]. Second, when you possess a [Certificate of
Earned Eligibility], the Board presumes you will probably live and remain at liberty
without violating the law—which means unless the Board affirmatively finds
otherwise, you should get parole.” (footnote omitted)).
45 See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 867(4) (McKinney 2016) (“An inmate who has
successfully completed a shock incarceration program shall be eligible to receive such a
certificate of earned eligibility pursuant to section eight hundred five of this chapter.”).
46 See id. (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an inmate sentenced
to a determinate sentence of imprisonment who has successfully completed a shock
incarceration program shall be eligible to receive such a certificate of earned eligibility
and shall be immediately eligible to be conditionally released.”).
47 See PRISON VISITING PROJECT, supra note 25, at 3.
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criteria, including an inmate’s age, length of sentence, and
criminal record.48 An eligible inmate must not have been convicted
of certain classes of offenses49 and may be denied participation in
Shock because of an outstanding warrant, detainer, or
commitment.50 After the initial screening, DOCCS transfers the
eligible inmates to the Lakeview Shock Incarceration Center. At
Lakeview, the inmates are housed in reception dorms where they
undergo a second screening.51 This consists of a medical and
psychological evaluation and a background check to ensure that
inmates do not have pending charges or any history of violent
behavior.52 Lakeview staff also focus on whether the circumstances
of the inmates’ crimes demonstrate predatory behavior or a high
degree of criminal sophistication.53
Assuming that the inmate meets these criteria, he or she
will most likely be allowed54 to participate in the program.
Inmates who are deemed eligible either remain at Lakeview or
are transferred to another facility to complete the program.55 The
48 See DEPT. OF CORR. AND CMTY. SUPERVISION, DIRECTIVE NO. 0086, SHOCK
INCARCERATION FACILITIES (2013) [hereinafter DIRECTIVE NO. 0086] (“An inmate may
apply for participation in the Shock Incarceration Program if he or she: 1. Is at least 16
but less than 50 years of age; 2. Is sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment
and will become eligible for release on parole within three years, or is sentenced to a
determinate term of imprisonment and will be eligible for conditional release within
three years; 3. Was between 16-49 years of age at the time of the commission of the
crime; and 4. Has not previously been convicted of a violent felony in New York as
defined in article 70 of the Penal Law or a felony in any other jurisdiction which
includes all essential elements of any such violent felony, upon which an indeterminate
or determinate term of imprisonment was imposed.”).
49 See id. (“Notwithstanding the foregoing [criteria], no person who is
convicted of any of the following crimes shall be deemed eligible to participate in this
program: 1. A violent felony offense; 2. An A-1 felony offense; 3. Any homicide offense
as defined in article 125 of the Penal Law; 4. Any felony sex offense as defined in
article 130 of the Penal Law; or 5. Any escape or absconding offense as defined in
article 205 of the Penal Law.”).
50 See id. (“The Shock Incarceration Selection Committee shall examine each
inmate’s record to determine whether the inmate has any of the following detainers,
warrants, or commitments outstanding, which, in the discretion of the committee, may
bar the inmate from participation in the Shock Incarceration Program: 1. Criminal
related detainer or warrant; 2. Bail warrant; 3. Immigration warrant; 4. Probation
warrant or out of State parole warrant; or 5. Concurrent or Consecutive out of State or
Federal Commitments.”).
51 See PRISON VISITING PROJECT, supra note 25, at 3.
52 Id.; seeDIRECTIVENO. 0086, supra note 48.
53 See PRISON VISITING PROJECT, supra note 25, at 3.
54 See SHOCK REPORT, supra note 25, at 6. From July 13, 1987, until
September 30, 2006, 54.5% of all initially eligible inmates were sent to Shock. Id. The
vast majority of those who were not sent were disqualified for one of four reasons:
medical (9.9%), public risk (5.9%), criminal history (5.4%), and mental health (5.0%).
Id. An additional 8.5% refused to participate in the program. Id. Thus, assuming an
inmate agrees to participate in the program and meets the primary screening criteria,
there is a very high chance that they will be approved for participation.
55 See PRISONVISITING PROJECT, supra note 25, at 5. Until 2011, New York State
had five Shock facilities. Since then, three have closed, making Lakeview and Moriah the
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inmates are then organized into “platoons” of “10 to 15 women or
50 to 60 men.”56 The newly formed platoons then enter an
intensive two-week period known as Zero Weeks, which focuses
primarily on the physical training and disciplinary aspects of the
program.57 At the conclusion of Zero Weeks, the regular Shock
program begins.
The Shock program is highly regimented.58 Shock inmates
are woken up by a military bugle call at 5:30 a.m.59 Inmates then
form lines on an outdoor asphalt area, regardless of the weather,
and complete a rigorous physical training routine led by drill
instructors who ensure full inmate participation.60 After physical
training, the inmates eat breakfast and begin a full day of
programming that ends at 9:00 p.m. on weekdays.61 The week’s
daytime programming is generally broken up into six-hour days,
including one day focused entirely on education, one day of
programming, which includes alcohol and substance abuse
treatment, and three days of either work or vocational training.62
In the evenings, the inmates have educational classes, alcohol and
substance abuse treatment, programs to help with confrontation,
and other rehabilitative programming.63 The inmates’ day ends at
9:30 p.m. with lights out.64
At all points, the program seeks to instill in the inmates
a sense of teamwork and mutual accountability. Platoons live
together, work together, and have daily meetings to resolve
problems.65 At any point, the entire platoon can be disciplined
for the insubordination of one inmate. Overall, the program is
intended to be physically and emotionally taxing, with the goal
being to “break [the inmates] down and build them up.”66
only remaining Shock facilities. Joanna Walters, New York’s Boot-Camp Prisons Get the
Boot, ALJAZEERA AM. (Dec. 9, 2013, 5:30 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/12/
9/new-york-s-boot-campprisonsgettheboot.html [http://perma.cc/5AVX-MDZ5].
56 PRISON VISITING PROJECT, supra note 25, at 5.
57 See id.
58 See id. at 6.
59 See id.
60 See id.
61 See id.
62 See id.
63 See id.
64 See id.
65 See CHERIE L. CLARK ET AL., SHOCK INCARCERATION IN NEW YORK: FOCUS ON
TREATMENT (1994), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/shockny.pdf [http://perma.cc/54BJ-8UT9].
66 Jim Kenyon, Inside Shock Incarceration—A CNY Central Special Report,
CNYCENTRAL.COM (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.cnycentral.com/news/story.aspx?id=
889911#.VMKh_mTF9kU [http://perma.cc/AD8J-3PSG].
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C. Results of the Shock Program
The vast majority of inmates who complete Shock—
roughly 99%—are released on parole. Further, participants in
the Shock program tend to be released from prison
approximately one year earlier than their court-determined
incarceration sentence.67 In addition to benefiting the inmates,
these early releases save the state a substantial amount of
money. As of September 30, 2006, 35,102 Shock participants
have seen early release, which has resulted in a savings of
nearly $1.18 billion for the State of New York.68 Shock graduates
pass the General Educational Development (GED) exam at
significantly higher rates than inmates at comparable medium
and minimum security facilities.69 In fiscal year 2005–2006,
Shock graduates who took the exam passed at a rate of 80%,
whereas the passage rates averaged 41% and 57% at minimum-
and medium-security facilities, respectively.70 Furthermore,
Shock graduates have lower recidivism rates than inmates who
were eligible for the program but did not participate.71 One, two,
and three years removed from the program, Shock graduates
remained in the community at rates of 92%, 78%, and 69%,
respectively, compared with rates of 84%, 68%, and 60%,
respectively, for the eligible but nonparticipating group.72
Overall, Shock is arguably a wildly successful program.
The vast majority of those who complete the program are
released, many far earlier than they would have been otherwise,
and once released, they generally experience better outcomes.
Meanwhile, the state saves a substantial amount of money by
reducing the prison population. The problem, however, is that not
all inmates who complete the program are released. And due to
the current parole review process, there is often no way for these
inmates to challenge the parole board’s decision. For those
inmates who are denied parole and left without recourse, it is no
consolation that the Shock program at large is successful. The
remainder of this note focuses on the effect of the Shock parole
review process on those inmates.
67 See SHOCK REPORT, supra note 25, at EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.
68 See id.
69 See id. at ii.
70 See id. at 32.
71 See id. at 48.
72 See id. at 48-50.
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II. GREENHOLTZ AND THEDEVELOPMENT OF A LIBERTY
INTEREST IN PAROLE
The New York parole laws governing the Shock program
create a legitimate expectation of release for inmates who have
completed the program. “The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause protects persons against deprivations of life,
liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural
protection must establish that one of these interests is at stake.”73
A liberty interest “may arise from an expectation or interest
created by state laws or policies.”74 In the context of parole, the
Supreme Court has held that “[t]here is no constitutional or
inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released
before the expiration of a valid sentence.”75 But although there is
no inherent right to parole, such a right can be created by state
laws governing parole decisions.76
The Supreme Court first found such a state-created
right to parole in Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal
and Correctional Complex. In Greenholtz, Nebraska inmates
brought a class action lawsuit claiming, among other things,
that the procedure of the Nebraska parole boards denied them
due process.77 The inmates first argued that a liberty interest
in parole exists whenever a state holds out the possibility of
parole.78 This argument was quickly rejected by the Court,
which found that “the possibility of parole provides no more
than a mere hope that the benefit will be obtained.”79 The
inmates also argued, however, that the language of the
Nebraska statute itself created a liberty interest in parole
release.80 The Nebraska statute provided that “whenever the
Board of Parole considers the release of a committed offender
who is eligible for release on parole, it shall order his release
unless it is of the opinion that his release should be deferred
because” certain enumerated factors are found to exist.81 The
73 Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005).
74 Id.
75 Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979).
76 Robles v. Dennison, 745 F. Supp. 2d 244, 261 (W.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d, 449
Fed. App’x 51 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Greenholtz, 442 U.S. 1).
77 See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 1, 3-4.
78 See id. at 9.
79 Id. at 11.
80 Id.
81 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 83-1,114(1) (1976)).
The factors that can result in the deferral of parole include when
(a) There is a substantial risk that he will not conform to the conditions of parole;
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inmates argued “that the structure of the provision together
with the use of the word ‘shall’ binds the Board of Parole to
release an inmate unless any one of the four specifically
designated reasons are found.”82 Without analyzing the statute,
the Court nevertheless noted its “unique structure and
language” and therefore “accept[ed] [the inmates’] view that
the expectancy of release provided in this statute is entitled to
some measure of constitutional protection.”83
Seven years later, in Board of Pardons v. Allen, the
Supreme Court similarly held that a Montana parole statute
created a liberty interest in parole release.84 Montana law
provided that “[s]ubject to the following restrictions, the board
shall release on parole . . . any person confined in the Montana
state prison or the women’s correction center . . . when in its
opinion there is a reasonable probability that the prisoner can be
released without detriment to the prisoner or to the community.”85
The Court compared the language of the Montana statute with
the Nebraska statute in Greenholtz and explained that
“[s]ignificantly, the Montana statute, like the Nebraska statute,
uses mandatory language (‘shall’) to ‘creat[e] a presumption that
parole release will be granted’ when the designated findings are
made.”86 The Court held that, based on Greenholtz, the mandatory
language in the Montana statute created “a liberty interest
protected by the Due Process Clause.”87
A. New York’s Parole Scheme
Prior to December 31, 1977, parole in New York was
governed by Correction Law section 213, which provided, in
pertinent part,
Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward
for good conduct or efficient performance of duties assigned in prison,
(b) His release would depreciate the seriousness of his crime or promote
disrespect for the law;
(c) His release would have a substantially adverse effect on institutional
discipline; or
(d) His continued correctional treatment, medical care, or vocational or
other training in the facility will substantially enhance his capacity to
lead a law-abiding life when released at a later date.
Id. (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 83-1,114(1)).
82 Id. at 11-12 (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 83-1,114(1)).
83 Id. at 12.
84 Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 381 (1987).
85 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-201 (1985) (emphasis added).
86 Allen, 482 U.S. at 377-78 (footnote omitted) (quotingGreenholtz, 442 U.S. 1, 12).
87 Id. at 379.
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but only if the board of parole is of the opinion that there is a reasonable
probability that, if such prisoner is released, he will live and remain at
liberty without violating the law and that his release is not incompatible
with the welfare of society. If the board of parole shall so determine, such
prisoner shall be allowed to go upon parole outside of prison walls and
inclosure upon such terms and conditions as the board shall prescribe,
but to remain while thus on parole in the legal custody of the warden of
the prison from which he is paroled, until the expiration of the
maximum term specified in his sentence.88
In analyzing the statute, the court in Robles v. Dennison
noted that “the wording of former N.Y. Corr. Law § 213—in
particular the language . . . in italics—closely parallels the
language in the Nebraska and Montana parole statutes, which
were addressed in Greenholtz and Allen, respectively.”89 Based
on “the analytical method set forth in Greenholtz, [the] Court
[found] it clear that former N.Y. Corr. Law § 213 gave rise to a
cognizable liberty interest in release on parole.”90
In 1977, perhaps anticipating Greenholtz, the New
York legislature repealed Correction Law section 213.91 Its
replacement, New York Executive Law section 259-i, provides,
in pertinent part, that
[d]iscretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a
reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while
confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that,
if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without
violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the
welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime
as to undermine respect for law.92
Significantly, the mandatory “shall . . . unless” language in
Correction Law section 213 was not included in Executive Law
section 259-i.
Since 1977, as a result of this change, it has been well
settled by both state and federal courts that the New York parole
laws do not create a legitimate expectancy of release.93 In Boothe
v. Hammock, for example, the Second Circuit explained that it
was “apparent that New York’s parole provisions . . . do not
establish a scheme whereby parole shall be ordered unless
specified conditions are found to exist.”94 Shortly after Boothe, the
88 N.Y.CORRECT. LAW § 213 (McKinney 1968) (repealed 1978) (emphasis added).
89 Robles v. Dennison, 745 F. Supp. 2d 244, 264 (W.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d, 449
Fed. App’x 51 (2d Cir. 2011).
90 Id.
91 Id. at 265; N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 213 (McKinney 1968) (repealed 1978).
92 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (2016).
93 See Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001).
94 Boothe v. Hammock, 605 F.2d 661, 664 (2d Cir. 1979) (emphasis added).
1332 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:3
New York Court of Appeals similarly held in Russo v. N.Y. Board
of Parole that the New York statute merely created guidelines
that were to be followed unless there were reasons for doing
otherwise.95 The court reasoned that the mere fact “[t]hat
guidelines are provided does not mean they cannot be deviated
from or create an entitlement to release at any particular time;
the system is thus discretionary and holds out no more than the
possibility of parole.”96 Consequently, the New York Court of
Appeals joined the Second Circuit in holding that the New York
parole scheme does not create a liberty interest that would
implicate the Due Process Clause.
B. New York’s Shock Parole Scheme
1. Does a Liberty Interest Exist?
In Boothe and Russo, the courts were restricting their
analysis to the New York parole provisions in Executive Law
section 259-i, which apply to the general prison population.
Their analysis was rightly limited, as none of the inmates
bringing these cases had completed Shock or had otherwise
received a Certificate of Earned Eligibility. But Executive Law
section 259-i does not comprise the entirety of the parole
scheme. In determining whether a liberty interest in parole
release is created upon an inmate’s completion of Shock,
Executive Law section 259-i must be analyzed in conjunction
with the parole laws that apply specifically to Shock inmates—
specifically, Correction Law sections 805 and 867.
Correction Law section 805 provides that an inmate
serving a qualifying sentence who has received a Certificate of
Earned Eligibility “shall be granted parole release . . . unless” the
board finds the inmate unsuited for parole.97 Section 805 applies
not only to inmates who have completed Shock, but to all inmates
who have received a Certificate of Earned Eligibility as a result
of completed qualified programming. Correction Law section 867
95 See Russo v. N.Y. Bd. of Parole, 405 N.E.2d 225, 228 (N.Y. 1980) (citing
Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979);
Walker v. Oswald, 449 F.2d 481, 485 (2d Cir. 1971)).
96 Id.
97 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 805 (McKinney 2016) (emphasis added) (“Notwithstanding
any other provision of law, an inmate who is serving a sentence with a minimum term of not
more than six years and who has been issued a certificate of earned eligibility, shall be
granted parole release at the expiration of his minimum term or as authorized by
subdivision four of section eight hundred sixty-seven unless the board of parole determines
that there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will not live and
remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release is not compatible with the
welfare of society.”).
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then states that an inmate serving a qualifying sentence “who has
successfully completed a shock incarceration program shall be
eligible to receive [a Certificate of Earned Eligibility] . . . and
shall be immediately eligible to be conditionally released.”98
Relying on the Supreme Court’s analysis in Greenholtz,
several courts have held that New York Correction Law section
805 “creates a liberty interest which entitles inmates to some due
process protections in the consideration of their parole
applications.”99 Like the statutes analyzed in Greenholtz and
Allen, Correction Law section 805 contains mandatory language,
which creates a presumption that inmates will be released on
parole unless certain conditions are found to exist. Further, with
respect to inmates who have completed Shock, this presumption
is expressed explicitly in Title 9 of New York State Compilation of
Codes, Rules and Regulations, section 8010.2(a), which provides
that an “inmate’s successful completion of the [Shock] program,
and receipt of a certificate of earned eligibility, shall create a
presumption in favor of parole release.”100 A presumption in favor
98 Id. § 867 (McKinney 2016) (emphasis added) (“An inmate who has
successfully completed a shock incarceration program shall be eligible to receive such a
certificate of earned eligibility pursuant to section eight hundred five of this chapter.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an inmate sentenced to a determinate
sentence of imprisonment who has successfully completed a shock incarceration
program shall be eligible to receive such a certificate of earned eligibility and shall be
immediately eligible to be conditionally released.”).
99 Schwartz v. Dennison, 518 F. Supp. 2d 560, 571-72 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) aff’d,
339 F. App’x 28 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Gittens v. Thomas, No. 02 Civ. 9435(JSM), 2003
WL 21277151, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2003) (noting that “[s]ince petitioner has
received a certificate of earned eligibility, he has a protectable liberty interest which
entitles him to due process in the consideration of his application for parole”); Walters
v. Ross, No. CV-92-2290 (CPS), 1992 WL 398307, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 1992) (noting
that N.Y. Correction Law § 805 “falls squarely within the category of parole statutes
that affirmatively create a liberty interest”).
100 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 8010.2(a) (2008) (emphasis added). It
is important to note that this liberty interest is created upon receipt of the earned
eligibility certificate, and not upon application to, or enrollment in, Shock. In Klos v.
Haskel, 48 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 1995), the Second Circuit considered the question of
whether an inmate has a liberty interest in participating or remaining in Shock. First,
with respect to an inmate’s right to participate in Shock, the court noted,
While a screening committee must review the inmate’s application to determine
whether the “inmate’s participation in the shock program is consistent with the
safety of the community, the welfare of the applicant and the rules and
regulations of the department,” and while the committee, if it finds the
application in compliance with these requirements, “shall forward the application
to the commissioner or his designee for approval or disapproval,” the statute is
entirely silent on how the Commissioner is to exercise his discretion in approving
or disapproving the forwarded action.
Id. at 87 (citations omitted) (quoting N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 867.2). Second, with respect
to an inmate’s right to remain in Shock, the court stated that “the statute and
regulations make clear that, once an inmate has been admitted into the shock program,
he is entitled to no legitimate expectation that he will continue in and complete the
program, regardless of his full compliance with the program rules.” Id. at 87-88. The
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of release is further supported by the parole board’s historical
application of the statutes. As previously noted, DOCCS statistics
indicate that between 1987 and 2006, only one percent of inmates
who completed Shock were denied release by the parole board.101
Under the Supreme Court’s analysis in Greenholtz, the New York
parole scheme clearly creates a legitimate expectancy of release in
inmates who successfully participate in Shock and receive a
Certificate of Earned Eligibility.
2. What Process Is Due?
Once a liberty interest is created, the “next considerations
would be (1) what process is due to the prisoner in protecting that
interest, and (2) whether the Parole Board’s actions concerning
the parole release decision accorded him such process.”102 The
Greenholtz Court held that “[t]he Nebraska procedure affords an
opportunity to be heard, and when parole is denied it informs the
inmate in what respects he falls short of qualifying for parole; this
affords the process that is due under these circumstances. The
Constitution does not require more.”103 Similarly, in Robles, the
court determined that the New York parole scheme afforded
court held that under “this explicit statutory scheme . . . no reasonable factfinder could
conclude that the alleged promises by prison officials—to the effect that participants
who followed program rules could expect to complete the program and earn a certificate
of earned eligibility—conferred an enforceable liberty interest on shock program
participants.” Id. at 88. Though this case certainly limits the liberty interest of Shock
participants, it is not clear that it extends to Shock participants who have received an
earned eligibility certificate and undergo a review by the parole board.
101 See SHOCK REPORT, supra note 25, at 12. To put this statistic in context, a
DOCCS report for the year 2013 shows that the percentage of regular inmates (excluding
Shock, medical parole, and other special categories) who were granted parole after an initial
hearing was only 15%. DEP’T OF CORR. AND CMTY. SUPERVISION, PAROLE BOARD AND
PRESUMPTIVE RELEASE DISPOSITIONS: CALENDAR YEAR 2013 (2013). It is worth noting that
the same report also shows the parole release rate for Shock inmates to be 85%, compared
with the 99% for the years 1987–2006 listed in the Shock Legislative Report. See id. This
report, however, does not explain whether the 15% of Shock inmates who were not released
on parole were merely denied release or whether they were removed from the program prior
to a decision by the parole board. See id. In any event, whether the percentage of Shock
inmates released on parole is closer to 99% or 85%, these statistics are relevant only to
demonstrate that the presumption in favor of release is supported by the parole board’s
actions with respect to inmates who complete Shock in comparison to regular inmates.
These statistics are not intended to suggest that the likelihood of release in and of itself
creates a liberty interest. It has been well established that “[n]o matter how frequently a
particular form of clemency has been granted, the statistical probabilities standing alone
generate no constitutional protections . . . . The ground for a constitutional claim, if any,
must be found in statutes or other rules defining the obligations of the authority charged
with exercising clemency.” Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 465 (1981).
102 Robles v. Dennison, 745 F. Supp. 2d 244, 273 (W.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d, 449
Fed. App’x 51 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal and Corr.
Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 16 (1979)).
103 Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16.
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petitioner sufficient process.104 As in Greenholtz, the Robles court
held that due process was satisfied where the petitioner was
provided a hearing and a written denial.105
The Robles decision is correct under Greenholtz to the
extent that it is based solely on an analysis of Executive Law
section 259-i(2)(a). This section requires that the parole board
personally interview inmates who are eligible for release and, if
parole is denied, that the board inform the inmates in writing
of the reasons for the denial.106 This provision also generally
applies to inmates who have received a Certificate of Earned
Eligibility. For example, though the court in Schwartz v.
Dennison found that a liberty interest existed where the
inmate received a Certificate of Earned Eligibility, the inmate’s
due process claims were ultimately dismissed because, among
other things, he was granted a hearing and was able to present
evidence in support of his release.107
This provision, however, does not apply to an inmate who
has completed Shock. Instead, Executive Law section 259-i(2)(e)
applies, which provides that “[n]otwithstanding the requirements
of paragraph (a) of this subdivision, the determination to parole
an inmate who has successfully completed the shock incarceration
program . . . may be made without a personal interview.”108
Unlike the Nebraska statute in Greenholtz, the Montana
statute in Allen, and Executive Law section 259-i(2)(a) in Robles
and Schwartz, Executive Law section 259-i(2)(e) does not afford
inmates who have completed Shock an opportunity to be heard
and therefore deprives them of their Fourteenth Amendment
right to due process.109
104 Robles, 745 F. Supp. 2d 244.
105 Id. at 274 (“He had an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence at his
interviews before the Parole Board panels; the Parole Board has issued written[ ]
statements of denial, giving statutorily recognized reasons for its decision; notwithstanding
that the decisions have more often than not been quite perfunctory and devoid of any truly
individualized assessment of Robles as a parole candidate.”).
106 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i(2)(a) (2016) (“[A]t least one month prior to the date on
which an inmate may be paroled . . . , a member or members as determined by the rules of
the board shall personally interview such inmate and determine whether he should be
paroled . . . . If parole is not granted upon such review, the inmate shall be informed in
writing within two weeks of such appearance of the factors and reasons for such denial of
parole. Such reasons shall be given in detail and not in conclusory terms.”).
107 See Schwartz v. Dennison, 518 F. Supp. 2d 560, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d,
339 F. App’x 28 (2d Cir. 2009).
108 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i(2)(e).
109 It is worth noting that this was not always the case. Prior to 1992, Shock
inmates were subject to the same parole review process as other inmates. The New York
Executive Law was amended in 1992 to remove the requirement of a personal interview as
a way to save the state money. See Act of Apr. 10, 1992, ch. 55, 1992 N.Y. Sess. Law 2242
(McKinney); N.Y., OMNIBUS REVENUE, FEE, AND ARTICLE VII BILL: SECTION BY SECTION
ANALYSIS, A. 10565, 215th Legis., at 11 (1992).
1336 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:3
III. THE EFFECT OF THE CURRENT SHOCK PAROLE REVIEW
PROCESS
The failure of the New York parole scheme to provide a
hearing to an inmate who has completed Shock has a number of
negative effects on the parole review process. The primary effect
is that inmates who are denied parole upon completion of Shock
are deprived of meaningful appellate review. In order to
understand this problem, it is important to first understand the
parole review process. In New York, the parole review process is
governed by Executive Law section 259 and Title 9 of New York
State Compilation of Codes, Rules and Regulations, Parts 8000-
8011.110 In making its decision, the parole board must consider
certain statutory factors.111 These factors include the inmate’s
institutional record, performance in any temporary release
programs, and plans upon release.112 The board must also
consider the length of the inmate’s sentence, the seriousness of
the offense, the inmate’s criminal record, any deportation orders,
and any statements by the victim(s).113 In making a decision to
grant or deny parole, the board has broad discretion and is
permitted to weigh the statutory factors as it sees fit.114
110 See COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW, supra note 7; N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 259; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS tit. 9, §§ 8000-11 (2008).
111 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i (2)(c)(A).
112 See id.
113 See id. (“In making the parole release decision, the guidelines adopted
pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this article shall
require that the following be considered: (i) the institutional record including program
goals and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational education, training or
work assignments, therapy and interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii)
performance, if any, as a participant in a temporary release program; (iii) release plans
including community resources, employment, education and training and support
services available to the inmate; (iv) any deportation order issued by the federal
government against the inmate while in the custody of the department of correctional
services and any recommendation regarding deportation made by the commissioner of
the department of correctional services pursuant to section one hundred forty-seven of
the correction law; (v) any statement made to the board by the crime victim or the
victim’s representative, where the crime victim is deceased or is mentally or physically
incapacitated; (vi) the length of the determinate sentence to which the inmate would be
subject had he or she received a sentence pursuant to section 70.70 or section 70.71 of
the penal law for a felony defined in article two hundred twenty or article two hundred
twenty-one of the penal law; (vii) the seriousness of the offense with due consideration
to the type of sentence, length of sentence and recommendations of the sentencing
court, the district attorney, the attorney for the inmate, the presentence probation
report as well as consideration of any mitigating and aggravating factors, and activities
following arrest prior to confinement; and (viii) prior criminal record, including the
nature and pattern of offenses, adjustment to any previous probation or parole
supervision and institutional confinement.”).
114 Rabenbauer v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. and Cmty. Supervision, 995
N.Y.S.2d 490, 492 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014); see also Phillips v. Dennison, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121,
124 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (“[W]hile the relevant statutory factors must be considered, it
is well settled that the weight to be accorded to each of the factors lies solely within the
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Within 30 days of receipt of the written denial of his or her
parole, an inmate may appeal to the Appeals Unit of the parole
board.115 The Appeals Unit may consider the following questions:
(1) [W]hether the proceeding and/or determination was in violation of
lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law, was arbitrary and
capricious or was otherwise unlawful;
(2) whether the board member or members making the determination
relied on erroneous information as shown in the record of the
proceeding, or relevant information was not available for
consideration;
(3) whether the determination made was excessive.116
When appealing to the board, an inmate has the right to
be represented by an attorney, and if unable to afford an
attorney, may have one assigned upon request.117 The inmate
also has a right to obtain the transcript from his or her parole
hearing,118 as well as “[a]ll other nonconfidential, discoverable
documents relating to the appeal.”119 If the administrative
appeal is denied, an inmate may seek judicial relief by beginning
an Article 78 proceeding.120
discretion of the Parole Board.” (quoting Walker v. Travis, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52, 53 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1998))).
115 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 8006.1(b).
116 Id. § 8006.3(a).
117 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i(4)(b).
118 See id. § 259-i(6)(a) (“The board shall provide for the making of a verbatim
record of each parole release interview, except where a decision is made to release the
inmate to parole supervision, and each preliminary and final revocation hearing,
except when the decision of the presiding officer after such hearings result in dismissal
of all charged violations of parole, conditional release or post release supervision.”); see
also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 8006.1(e) (“At the time of the filing of the
notice of appeal, the inmate/violator or the attorney therefore may request a copy of the
transcript of the proceeding from which the appeal was taken.”).
119 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 8006.1(e).
120 An Article 78 proceeding is the method by which to challenge a decision or
action by a New York State administrative agency or other government body. See COLUMBIA
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW, supra note 7, ch. 22. Article 78 proceedings are brought in
New York Supreme Court and require that the petitioner have previously exhausted all
administrative remedies. See id. In an Article 78 proceeding, the court may only consider the
following:
1. [W]hether the body or officer failed to perform a duty enjoined upon it by law;
or
2. whether the body or officer proceeded, is proceeding or is about to proceed
without or in excess of jurisdiction; or
3. whether a determination was made in violation of lawful procedure, was
affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of
discretion, including abuse of discretion as to the measure or mode of
penalty or discipline imposed; or
1338 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:3
In the context of parole review, “[j]udicial intervention is
warranted only when there is a ‘showing of irrationality bordering
on impropriety.’”121 Indeed, the “parole board enjoys a significant
level of discretion” in making its decisions.122 But despite the
parole board’s wide discretion, there are certain things it cannot
do.123 First, the board cannot base its decision on erroneous
information.124 As noted by Justice Marshall in his dissent in
Greenholtz, inmate files often contain “substantial inaccuracies.”125
For example, in Udzinski v. Coughlin, the petitioner’s crime and
sentence report erroneously stated that petitioner sexually abused
the victim with a knife.126 In Brown v. Goord, petitioner’s
guidance file described him as a sex offender based only upon
allegations of which he was acquitted.127 In Hetherington v.
Coughlin, petitioner’s prison file incorrectly referred to him as a
“fugitive from the Alabama Correctional System.”128
In addition to the potential for actual inaccuracies in an
inmate’s file, the parole board may also misunderstand or
misstate correct information in the inmate’s file. In Henry v.
Dennison, the petitioner was indicted for both intentional murder
and depraved indifference murder, which does not require the
element of intent.129 A jury found him guilty of depraved
indifference murder, but not guilty of intentional murder. The
parole board, however, in considering petitioner for parole,
4. whether a determination made as a result of a hearing held, and at which
evidence was taken, pursuant to direction by law is, on the entire record,
supported by substantial evidence.
5. A proceeding to review the final determination or order of the state review
officer pursuant to subdivision three of section forty-four hundred four of the
education law shall be brought pursuant to article four of this chapter and such
subdivision; provided, however, that the provisions of this article shall not
apply to any proceeding commenced on or after the effective date of this
subdivision.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7803 (McKinney 2016).
121 Silmon v. Travis, 741 N.E.2d 501, 504 (N.Y. 2000) (quoting Russo v. N.Y. State
Bd. of Parole, 405 N.E.2d 225, 229 (N.Y. 1980)); see Russo, 405 N.E.2d 225, 229; Rabenbauer
v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. and Cmty. Supervision, 995 N.Y.S.2d 490, 492-93 (2014).
122 Rabenbauer, 995 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
123 Id.
124 See Plevy v. Travis, 793 N.Y.S.2d 262 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005).
125 Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 33
(1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
126 Udzinski v. Coughlin, 592 N.Y.S.2d 801, 802 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (“We find a
rational basis in the . . . crime and sentence report insofar as [it] may be read to indicate
that petitioner assaulted the victim with a knife, causing serious physical injuries, and also
sexually abused the victim. We find, however, no basis for the information in the crime and
sentence report insofar as it may be read to indicate that petitioner sexually abused the
victim with a knife.”).
127 Brown v. Goord, 796 N.Y.S.2d 439 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005).
128 Hetherington v. Coughlin, 511 N.Y.S.2d 392 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
129 Henry v. Dennison, 833 N.Y.S.2d 418, 419 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007).
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referred to the murder as intentional.130 Similarly, in Lewis v.
Travis, the petitioner was convicted of murder in the second
degree, but the “Board incorrectly referred to petitioner’s conviction
as murder in the first degree.”131 In both cases, the court concluded
that the parole board may have relied on incorrect information in
denying petitioner’s parole and accordingly ordered that petitioner
receive a new parole hearing.132 Though perhaps less likely than
incorrect information in the prison file, there is still a real danger
of the parole board misconstruing an otherwise accurate file. In
either situation, when the parole board bases its decision on
erroneous information, it has acted improperly, and the inmate
must be given a de novo hearing.133
Second, the board’s discretion is limited by the
requirement that it consider and weigh all the relevant statutory
factors, not just the seriousness of the offense.134 Consideration of
these factors requires more than a mere acknowledgment that
they exist.135 Only after considering all the factors relevant to a
particular inmate may the board assign greater or lesser weight
or emphasis to particular factors.136 In Coaxum v. New York State
Board of Parole, the board’s failure to undertake a full evaluation
of the inmate’s ability to “remain at liberty without violating the
law,” including considering her exemplary record, rendered its
decision arbitrary.137 In Wallman v. Travis, the court found that
the board’s “fleeting reference” to the inmate’s disciplinary record,
programming, and community support was insufficient.138 In King
v. New York State Division of Parole, where the petitioner had
been convicted of killing a police officer, the New York Court of
130 Id.
131 Lewis v. Travis, 780 N.Y.S.2d 243, 243 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).
132 Id.; see also Henry, 833 N.Y.S.2d at 419 (“We find merit in petitioner’s
argument that ‘the Board relied on incorrect information’ in denying his request for
parole release by referring to his underlying criminal acts, which resulted in his
conviction of depraved indifference murder, as intentional. Accordingly, we reverse the
judgment and direct that a new hearing be held.” (citations omitted)).
133 See Plevy v. Travis, 793 N.Y.S.2d 262, 262 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (“The Board
improperly based its decision, in part, on a prior violation of probation which was
dismissed . . . . Inasmuch as we agree that the determination was based on erroneous
information, we are constrained to reverse the judgment and order a new hearing . . . .”);
Smith v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 824 N.Y.S.2d 498, 499 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (“Because
respondent relied upon erroneous information in denying parole release, this Court must
annul respondent’s determination and remit for a new hearing.”).
134 See Huntley v. Evans, 910 N.Y.S.2d 112, 113-14 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010)
(“[W]here the Parole Board denies release to parole solely on the basis of the seriousness of
the offense, in the absence of any aggravating circumstance, it acts irrationally.”).
135 See Wallman v. Travis, 794 N.Y.S.2d 381, 381 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005);
Coaxum v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 827 N.Y.S.2d 489, 494 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006).
136 See Coaxum, 827 N.Y.S.2d at 494.
137 Id. at 495 (quoting N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i(2)(c)(A)).
138 Wallman, 794 N.Y.S.2d at 381.
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Appeals held that the board acted improperly, noting that “while
mention was made in the Board’s decision of other factors
relevant to petitioner’s release, these factors, all of which weighed
in favor of petitioner’s application, were mentioned only to
dismiss them in light of the fact that a police officer had been
killed.”139 In Morris v. New York State Department of Corrections,
the New York Supreme Court concluded that the
Board’s passing mention of Petitioner’s “receipt of an Earned Eligibility
Certificate, good behavior, program accomplishments (as able), and
document submissions” and its conclusory statement that “required
statutory factors have been considered, including your risk to the
community, rehabilitation efforts, and your needs for successful
community reintegration,” were woefully inadequate in the circumstances
of this case to demonstrate that the Board weighed or fairly considered
the required statutory factors.140
In all these cases, the parole board failed to consider all required
statutory factors and relied solely on the nature and severity of
the inmate’s offense, rendering its decisions improper.141
Finally, the parole board may not consider impermissible,
nonstatutory factors. For example, in King v. New York State
Division of Parole, one of the parole board members considered
impermissible factors, “including penal philosophy, the historical
treatment of individuals convicted of murder, the death penalty,
life imprisonment without parole, and the consequences to society
if those sentences are not in place.”142 Since Executive Law
section 259-i does not permit the board to consider such factors, the
court held that the petitioner was not afforded a proper hearing.143
Despite these limits on the board’s discretion, an inmate
seeking judicial review of a parole denial “bears a heavy
burden” in showing that the board acted improperly.144 “Absent
a ‘convincing demonstration’ to the contrary, the Board is
presumed to have acted properly in accordance with statutory
requirements.”145 In most cases, the only way an inmate can
meet this burden is by presenting the court with evidence from
139 King v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 598 N.Y.S.2d 245, 252 (N.Y. App. Div.
1993), aff’d, 632 N.E.2d 1277 (N.Y. 1994).
140 Morris v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. and Cmty. Supervision, 963 N.Y.S.2d
852, 858 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013).
141 See Wallman, 794 N.Y.S.2d at 389; Coaxum, 827 N.Y.S.2d at 493-97; see also
Huntley v. Evans, 910 N.Y.S.2d 112, 113-14 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (“[W]here the Parole
Board denies release to parole solely on the basis of the seriousness of the offense, in the
absence of any aggravating circumstance, it acts irrationally.” (citations omitted)).
142 King v. N.Y. State Division of Parole, 632 N.E.2d 1277, 1278 (N.Y. 1994).
143 Id.
144 Garcia v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
145 Nankervis v. Dennison, 817 N.Y.S.2d 123, 124 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006)
(quoting McLain v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (App. Div. 1994)).
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the hearing transcript that demonstrates that the board acted
improperly.146 Indeed, the very purpose of the statutory
“verbatim record” is to provide the court with a meaningful
opportunity to review the board’s actions to determine whether
they complied with the law.147 An inmate who has not been
provided a hearing has no “verbatim record” to rely on, and
thus must rely entirely on the written decision of the parole
board in making his or her case.
Executive Law section 259-i(2)(a) provides that if parole
is denied, the board must inform the inmate in writing of the
reasons for the denial within two weeks of the inmate’s parole
hearing.148 The reasons for the denial must be “given in detail
and not in conclusory terms.”149 As is the case with hearings,
detailed written parole decisions provide an opportunity for
meaningful review.150 Furthermore, detailed decisions help
inform inmates of the ways in which they must improve their
behavior if they are to be ultimately released.151 A parole board,
however, “need not expressly discuss each of [the statutory
factors] in its determination.”152
Typical parole board denials thus often contain
predictable, boilerplate language.153 A 1999 article co-authored
by Edward R. Hammock, the former Chairman of the New
York State Board of Parole, provides examples of what this
“trademark-boilerplate” parole denial can look like:
Parole denied. Hold 24 Months. The serious nature and circumstances
of the instant offense militates against discretionary release at this
time. To hold otherwise would deprecate the seriousness of the crime so
as to undermine respect for the law and thus constitute a threat to the
welfare of society.
146 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i(6)(a) (McKinney 2010 & Supp. 2014).
147 Collins v. Hammock, 465 N.Y.S.2d 84, 85 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983). For
examples of cases in which courts examined the hearing transcript, see Robles v.
Dennison, 745 F. Supp. 2d 244 (W.D.N.Y. 2010), Siao-Pao v. Dennison, 896 N.E.2d 87
(N.Y. 2008), Winchell v. Evans, 910 N.Y.S.2d 766 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010), Sagaria v. N.Y.
State Board of Parole, 885 N.Y.S.2d 713 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009), Molina v. Dennison, No.
01-06-ST6509, 2006 WL 6067445 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 25, 2006), Jackson v. Evans, 987
N.Y.S.2d 422 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014), Kelly v. Hagler, 942 N.Y.S.2d 290 (N.Y. App. Div.
2012), Hunter v. N.Y. State Division of Parole, 800 N.Y.S.2d 799 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005),
Vasquez v. Dennison, 812 N.Y.S.2d 190 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006), and Zhang v. Travis, 782
N.Y.S.2d 156 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).
148 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i(2)(a) (McKinney 2010 & Supp. 2014).
149 Id.
150 Cappiello v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 800 N.Y.S.2d 343, slip. op. at *6 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2004).
151 Id.
152 King v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 632 N.E.2d 1277, 1278 (N.Y. 1994).
153 See Edward R. Hammock & James F. Seelandt, New York’s Sentencing and
Parole Law: An Unanticipated and Unacceptable Distortion of the Parole Boards’
Discretion, 13 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 527, 535 (1999).
1342 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:3
On the other hand, . . . the release denial might flatly provide:
Parole is denied at this time. Next appearance: 24 months. It is the
opinion of this panel that, based on the nature of your criminality and our
concerns regarding recidivism, if released, you will not live and remain at
liberty without violating the law, thus making your discretionary release
incompatible with the safety and well-being of the community.154
The situation is no different in parole denials following
completion of Shock. For example, a 2013 Parole Board Release
Decision Notice from Lakeview reads, in its entirety:
Parole denied. Given the nature and extent of your difficulties in the
community, while we have considered your participation in the DOCCS
Shock program and the resultant anticipated issuance of an earned
eligibility certificate, it has been determined that there is a reasonable
probability that, if released, you will not live and remain at liberty
without violating the law and that your release at this time is not
compatible with the welfare of society. Required statutory factors have
been considered, including your risk to the community, rehabilitation
efforts, and your needs for successful community reintegration.155
Despite the obvious boilerplate nature of many parole
denials, courts rarely hold the written decisions themselves to be
merely “conclusory.” On those occasions where courts have held
that a decision was conclusory, they generally had the benefit of a
parole hearing transcript to provide context for the decision and
to aid in its evaluation.156 This type of evaluation is clearly
impossible in the case of Shock parole denials because no hearing
transcripts exist. Nevertheless, in the absence of a hearing
transcript, these boilerplate written decisions are the only
evidence an inmate has to present to the court to demonstrate the
parole board’s wrongdoing. As can be seen from the examples of
parole denials noted previously, these decisions do not provide the
inmate with a meaningful opportunity to show that the parole
board considered inaccurate information, that it failed to fully
consider and weigh the required statutory factors or that it
considered impermissible, nonstatutory factors. Indeed, based on
these decisions alone, a court would be hard-pressed to determine
whether the board actually looked at the inmate’s file at all. But
unless an inmate is able to provide convincing evidence that
proves otherwise, courts will presume that the parole board acted
properly and complied with statutory requirements.157 Thus, an
inmate armed only with a boilerplate parole denial has little
154 Id. at 527, 535-36 (footnotes omitted).
155 N.Y. DEPT. OF CORR. & CMTY. SUPERVISION, PAROLE BOARD RELEASE
DECISIONNOTICE (2013) (on file with author).
156 Siao-Pao v. Dennison, 896 N.E.2d 87 (N.Y. 2008).
157 See Jackson v. Evans, 987 N.Y.S.2d 422, 423 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014).
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chance of meeting the burden of demonstrating that the parole
board acted with the “irrationality bordering on impropriety”
necessary to warrant judicial intervention.158
IV. GIVE PROCESSWHERE PROCESS ISDUE
A. An Opportunity to Be Heard
Since the right created by the New York Correction Law
is identical to the right created by the Nebraska statute in
Greenholtz, the constitutionally required hearing in Greenholtz
must apply to New York as well. In Greenholtz, the Court held
that a hearing at which
the inmate is permitted to appear before the Board and present letters
and statements on his own behalf . . . provided . . . an effective opportunity
first, to insure that the records before the Board are in fact the records
relating to his case; and second, to present any special considerations
demonstrating why he is an appropriate candidate for parole.159
Such a procedure, applied to Shock parole reviews, would both
protect against erroneous parole denials and, once denied,
provide inmates with the opportunity to obtain meaningful
appellate review.
Fortunately, this procedure is similar, if not identical, to
the procedure currently in place for regular parole hearings in
New York. Regular parole hearings are conducted once a month
at each facility by a panel of two or three members of the parole
board.160 At the hearing, one panel member conducts a detailed
review of the inmate’s parole plan.161 The other panel members,
while present, “generally defer to the judgment of the member”
who conducted the review.162 At the hearing, the inmate is asked
questions about his or her future plans following release on parole,
his or her criminal and institutional record, and the circumstances
of the offense leading to the present incarceration.163 Significantly,
the inmate is permitted to “bring to [the] release hearing any
documents that would make a good impression on the panel
members, such as program certificates, diplomas, or letters of
158 Silmon v. Travis, 741 N.E.2d 501, 504 (N.Y. 2000); see Russo v. N.Y. State
Bd. of Parole, 405 N.E.2d 225, 229 (N.Y. 1980); Rabenbauer v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr.
and Cmty. Supervision, 2014 N.Y. slip op. 24347, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov 12, 2014).
159 Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1,
15 (1979).
160 COLUMBIAHUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW, supra note 7, ch. 36, pt. F.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
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recommendation.”164 Though “these [documents] should already
be in [the] parole file, . . . sometimes institutional authorities
forget to file them properly.”165 Considering the similarities
between these procedures and those in Greenholtz, it is no
surprise that the regular New York parole scheme has been
repeatedly held to meet minimum due process requirements.166
Thus, in order to make the Shock parole review process
constitutional, the New York legislature would merely have to
apply Executive Law section 259-i(2)(a) to Shock inmates.167 This
would be as simple as repealing Executive Law section 259-i(2)(e),
which provides that “notwithstanding the requirements of
paragraph (a) of this subdivision, the determination to parole an
inmate who has successfully completed the shock incarceration
program . . . may be made without a personal interview.”168 As a
result, Shock inmates would have a sufficient opportunity to be
heard. This is the bare minimum that due process requires, and
while “[t]he constitution does not require more,” it cannot tolerate
less.169
B. A Detailed Written Explanation
In addition to the requirement of a hearing, the Greenholtz
Court considered it a minimum requirement of due process that a
state’s parole procedure “inform[ ] the inmate in what respects he
falls short of qualifying for parole.”170 Though the Court did not
elaborate on the minimum requirements of such a denial, it found
“nothing in the due process concepts as they have thus far evolved
that requires the Parole Board to specify the particular ‘evidence’
in the inmate’s file or at his interview on which it rests the
discretionary determination that an inmate is not ready for
conditional release.”171 Thus, applying Greenholtz to the New York
procedure, the court in Robles held that while the decisions
denying the inmate parole were “more often than not . . . quite
164 Id.
165 Id.; see supra Part III.
166 See, e.g., Robles v. Dennison, 745 F. Supp. 2d 244, 274 (W.D.N.Y. 2010),
aff’d, 449 Fed. App’x 51, 55 (2d Cir. 2011); Blackett v. Thomas, No. 02 Civ. 9258 RMB
FM, 2003 WL 21744080, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2003); Tatta v. Miller, No. 05-CV-
1205 (FB)(MG), 2005 WL 2806236, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2005).
167 Compare N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i(2)(a) (McKinney 2010 & Supp. 2014), with
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i(2)(e).
168 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i(2)(e).
169 Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1,
16 (1979).
170 Id.
171 Id. at 15.
2016] A PROCESS WITHOUT PROCESS 1345
perfunctory and devoid of any truly individualized assessment,”
they nevertheless satisfied the requirements ofGreenholtz.172
Despite the fact that a more detailed denial is not
constitutionally required, adopting procedures that would better
inform the inmate of the specific reasons for the denial of his or
her parole would serve several important goals. These goals were
noted by the Eighth Circuit in Greenholtz.173 First, it would allow
for meaningful appellate review.174 Second, it would incentivize
the parole board to consider the appropriate factors and ignore
improper ones.175 Third, it would promote rehabilitation by
informing inmates of the ways in which they could improve their
behavior and make it more likely that they would be released in
the future.176 Moreover, even in cases where an inmate is deemed
unfit for parole because of a static factor that cannot be improved,
a detailed written statement of the board’s reasoning serves to
demonstrate that the board was not acting arbitrarily.177 Finally,
requiring a detailed written explanation would promote
consistency in the decisionmaking process.178
By requiring a more detailed and evidence-based parole
decision, the Eight Circuit recognized the potential for
erroneous and arbitrary parole decisions. In disagreeing with
the Eight Circuit, the Supreme Court assumed that “existing
procedures adequately reduce the likelihood that an inmate’s
files will contain incorrect information which could lead to an
erroneous decision.”179 This is simply not the case; erroneous
decisions happen all the time.180 And while a detailed parole
decision may not reduce the likelihood of erroneous decisions, it
gives inmates a meaningful opportunity for appellate review.
Furthermore, adopting such a procedure would
promote “the appearance of fairness and the confidence of
inmates in the decisionmaking process.”181 Indeed, the Court
in Morrissey recognized that affording inmates fair treatment
in the parole revocation process could have a positive impact on
rehabilitation by preventing inmates’ negative reactions to
172 Robles v. Dennison, 745 F. Supp. 2d 244, 274 (W.D.N.Y. 2010).
173 See Inmates of the Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex v. Greenholtz, 576 F.2d
1274, 1284-85 (8th Cir. 1978), rev’d, 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
174 Id. at 1284.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 1284-85.
177 Id. at 1285.
178 Id.
179 Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 33
(1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting in part).
180 See supra Part III.
181 Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 34 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part).
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arbitrary decisions.182 This rationale applies equally to the
initial parole review process as well.183
In the context of Shock, this consideration is perhaps even
more important. Shock is a voluntary yet rigorous program, and
while it certainly provides inmates with the opportunity for early
release, inmates may be less likely to participate in the program if
they believe that they may be denied release arbitrarily, with no
real possibility of appeal.184 Yet the more eligible inmates
participate, the more New York benefits from the program. More
participating inmates results in more rehabilitated inmates, as
well as greater financial savings for the state on the overall cost of
incarceration.185 In other words, the state has a number of
incentives for promoting the appearance of fairness in the Shock
parole review process. Providing the inmates with a detailed
explanation of why they were denied parole could prove to be a
win-win for both the state and the inmates.
CONCLUSION
The inmates that participate in the New York Shock
Incarceration Program should have a liberty interest in release on
parole.186 Unlike the general New York prison population, Shock
inmates possess more than a mere hope of being released; they
have a legitimate expectancy of release, which was statutorily
created through the inclusion of mandatory language in the New
York Correction Law.187 Thus, unlike the general New York prison
population, the Shock inmates are entitled to certain procedural
safeguards that conform with the minimum requirements of due
process as set forth in Greenholtz.188 In the parole context, these
requirements include the right to be heard and, if parole is denied,
to be informed of the reasons for the denial.189
Currently, the procedures for parole review of Shock
inmates do not conform with these minimum requirements.190
182 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972).
183 Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 34 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part).
184 Roughly nine percent of eligible inmates refuse to participate in the
program. See SHOCK REPORT, supra note 25, at 6. Of those that do participate, roughly
three percent voluntarily leave the program prior to completion. See id. at 13. While
the exact causes of inmates’ failure to participate in or complete Shock are unknown, it
is conceivable that one factor is the knowledge that after completing six months of
physically and emotionally demanding programming, they may nevertheless be denied
parole without recourse.
185 See SHOCK REPORT, supra note 25, at EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.
186 See supra Section II.C.1.
187 See supra Section II.C.1.
188 See supra Section II.C.2.
189 See supra Section II.C.2; Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16.
190 See supra Section II.C.2.
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Shock inmates are not afforded hearings where they can speak on
their own behalf and answer any questions or concerns of the
parole board.191 Further, though they are given a constitutionally
sufficient explanation for the denial of their parole, these
decisions are more often than not written in boilerplate language
that does not provide an individualized assessment of the
particular inmate’s suitability for parole release.192
The failure to provide procedural safeguards that conform
with due process deprives the inmates of the opportunity for
meaningful appellate review and can have several negative effects
on the parole decisionmaking process. There is an increased
likelihood of the parole board basing its denial on incorrect
information, either in the form of actually erroneous information
in the inmate’s file or by misunderstanding or misstating
otherwise accurate information.193 Further, there is an increased
likelihood of the parole board failing to consider and weigh all the
required statutory factors or considering irrelevant or
impermissible nonstatutory factors in denying parole.194 Finally,
the failure to provide adequate procedures degrades the
appearance of fairness and inmate confidence in the parole review
process.195 These effects can have a direct and significant impact
on both the actual period of incarceration of a given inmate and
the inmate’s decision to participate in Shock in the first place.
Nevertheless, the remedies for this problem are simple.
First, a hearing must be provided to all Shock inmates who
become eligible for parole. More than just being good policy,
such a hearing is constitutionally required under Greenholtz.196
Though this would be a new procedure in the context of Shock
parole reviews, it is otherwise widely practiced within the New
York parole scheme. Indeed, the vast majority of inmates in
New York, most of whom do not possess a liberty interest in
191 See supra Section II.C.2; N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i(2)(e) (McKinney 2016).
192 See supra Part III; Robles v. Dennison, 745 F. Supp. 2d 244, 274 (W.D.N.Y.
2010); Hammock & Seelandt, supra note 153, at 535; N.Y. DEPT. OF CORR. & CMTY.
SUPERVISION, PAROLE BOARD RELEASEDECISIONNOTICE (2013) (on file with author).
193 See supra Part III; Hetherington v. Coughlin, 511 N.Y.S.2d 392 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1987); Udzinski v. Coughlin, 592 N.Y.S.2d 801, 802 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992); Lewis v.
Travis, 780 N.Y.S.2d 243, 243 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004); Brown v. Goord, 796 N.Y.S.2d 439
(N.Y. App. Div. 2005); Henry v. Dennison, 833 N.Y.S.2d 418, 419 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007).
194 See supra Part III; King v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 598 N.Y.S.2d 245, 252
(N.Y. App. Div. 1993), aff’d, 632 N.E.2d 1277 (N.Y. 1994); Wallman v. Travis, 794
N.Y.S.2d 381, 381 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005); Coaxum v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 827
N.Y.S.2d 489, 494 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006); Morris v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. and Cmty.
Supervision, 963 N.Y.S.2d 852, 858 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013).
195 See supra Part IV; Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972);
Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 34 (1979)
(Marshall, J., dissenting in part).
196 See supra Section II.C.1; Greenholtz, 442 U.S. 1.
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parole release, receive a statutorily required hearing before the
parole board.197 Thus, all that would be required of the New
York legislature would be to provide an existing and common
procedure for a small fraction of the prison population.
Second, Shock inmates should be given a detailed, written
decision explaining the reasons for the denial of parole. Though
not constitutionally required, such a detailed decision would allow
for intelligent appellate review while helping to ensure that the
parole board adhered to statutory guidelines and applied them
consistently.198 Further, detailed decisions would better inform
the inmate of the ways he or she must improve in the future in
order to be better suited for parole release.199 Finally, detailed
decisions would serve to promote inmate confidence in the
fairness of the Shock parole review process.200
These solutions are certainly not exhaustive, nor would
they entirely eliminate the risk of erroneous or arbitrary parole
decisions. Ultimately, parole decisions are almost entirely within
the discretion of the parole board. But to the extent that these
procedures would require the parole board to give more thought to
individual parole decisions, allow a court to intelligently review the
decisions, and promote inmate confidence in the system, they are
necessary components of a fair and just parole scheme. For “[o]ne
can imagine nothing more cruel, inhuman, and frustrating than
serving a prison term without knowledge of what will be measured
and the rules determining whether one is ready for release.”201
Adam Yefet†
197 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i (2016).
198 See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. 1; Inmates of the Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex v.
Greenholtz, 576 F.2d 1274, 1284-85 (8th Cir. 1978), rev’d, 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
199 See Inmates of the Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 576 F.2d at 1284-85.
200 See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 33 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
201 Id. at 35 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting K.C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY
JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 132 (1969)).
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